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RETURNING TO RETURNS: REVISITING THE BRITISH EDUCATION 
EVIDENCE 
Peter Dolton and Matteo Sandi 1 
We revisit the question of what is the rate of return to education in Great Britain. We make two contributions. Firstly, we re-assess the 
robustness of Harmon and Walker (1995), Oreopoulos (2006) and Devereux and Hart (2010) to equation specification and estimation 
method. Secondly, we generalize the previous IV approaches by using the month of birth in the calculation of a more accurate IV 
exploiting the 1947, 1963 and 1972 UK School Leaving Age reforms. Our results highlight the importance of equation specification 
and they provide a robust case for a 6% Rate of Return to Education for men. (Keywords: Returns to Education, Schooling, Instrumental 
Variables. JEL: H52, I21, I26, I28) 
 
The rate of return to education (RoRtE) is of central importance to education policy. It has variously 
been estimated that this rate of return could be as low as zero (e.g., Pischke and von Wachter, 2008) 
or as high as over 15% (e.g., Harmon and Walker, 1995, and Buscha and Dickson, 2012). If the RoRtE 
is zero then a continued policy of high level incentives to acquire more education is difficult to justify 
on financial grounds. In contrast, if the RoRtE is 15% per annum or greater, then parents and 
education authorities should provide strong incentives for staying at school for longer. Many papers 
have estimated this parameter (e.g., Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Card, 1995; Harmon and Walker, 
1995; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; Kling, 2001; Oreopoulos, 2006; Devereux and Hart, 2010; 
Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2011). It is therefore not surprising that there is considerable 
heterogeneity in the estimates retrieved for this single parameter. While the large number of estimates 
reflects the attention devoted by economists to this parameter, the heterogeneity of these results makes 
it difficult to inform education policy. 
A number of reasons may lie behind these heterogeneous estimates of the RoRtE. First, returns to 
education are likely to differ across different types of individuals (see, e.g., Kling 2001, Koop and 
Tobias 2004, and Carneiro et al. 2011). Second, heterogeneity in previous estimates may simply result 
from the fact that the RoRtE may differ across countries. For example, Pischke and von Wachter 
(2008) document a zero return to education in Germany; Grenet (2013) finds a return to education 
close to zero in France; Devereux and Hart (2010) report a 6% return to education in Britain. In part, 
heterogeneity in these estimates of the RoRtE may also derive from the fact that these were estimated 
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for different labour markets, at different points in time. For example, Devereux and Hart (2010) 
exploit an education reform that took place in 1947 in Britain while Grenet, 2013, instead, examines 
an education reform that took place in 1967 in France. Third, the RoRtE may also differ at different 
margins of education: the return to one more year of schooling at, e.g., age 14-15, may not be the 
same as the return to one more year of university. 
What is less well-known is the extent to which estimates may vary due to econometric specification 
and the estimation techniques employed. This can be investigated using consistent data over one 
period of time in a single country. In particular, in this paper we examine the sensitivity of some 
previous 2SLS estimates of the RoRtE to equation specification and to the definition of the 
instrumental variable (IV) used. Since the estimation of the earnings returns to education involves a 
well-known problem of endogeneity, much of the RoRtE literature has relied on IV estimation to 
retrieve unbiased and consistent treatment effects (e.g., Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Card, 1995; 
Harmon and Walker, 1995; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; Kling, 2001; Carneiro et al., 2011). In 
settings where the treatment is determined partly by whether the assignment variable crosses a cutoff 
point, i.e., “fuzzy” regression discontinuity (RD) designs, two-stage IV estimation strategies have 
been commonly employed (e.g., Oreopoulos, 2006). 
In order to conduct this analysis we focus on the empirical literature on the RoRtE from Great Britain. 
In this literature, two Raising of the School-Leaving Age (ROSLA) changes have received particular 
attention. The first took place in 1947, when the minimum school leaving age was raised from 14 to 
15. The second reform took place in 1972, when the age of compulsory schooling increased from 15 
to 16. An additional reform, that did not receive as much attention in this literature, also took place 
in Great Britain in 19632; in that year, the 1962 Education Act came into force, providing, among 
other things, a modification in the actual school leaving dates for pupils born in certain months of the 
calendar year. Unlike compulsory schooling law changes in the United States, that affected only 5 
percent of the relevant cohorts (Lleras-Muney, 2005)3, a high fraction of population was affected by 
the ROSLA changes in Great Britain (Oreopoulos, 2006). The large fraction of population affected 
by the ROSLA reforms arguably makes the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of these ROSLA 
reforms likely to be closer to an Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of the RoRtE (Oreopoulos, 2006); 
this, in turn,  made Great Britain a particularly interesting context for the RoRtE literature. 
                                                          
2 We are aware of only three studies that incorporate the 1963 reform in their analyses, namely Del Bono and Galindo-Rueda (2004, 2007), and Dickson 
and Smith (2011). 
3 The effects in other countries - e.g., Norway, Canada, and France - are similarly small (Albouy and Lequien 2009; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 
2008; Lleras-Muney 2005; Oreopoulos 2006). 
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Key contributions to the RoRtE literature in Great Britain are Harmon and Walker (1995), Oreopoulos 
(2006), and Devereux and Hart (2010). Harmon and Walker (1995) calculate a 15% RoRtE; 
Oreopoulos (2006) finds a 10-14% RoRtE; finally, Devereux and Hart (2010) conclude that the 
RoRtE is 6% or lower. All these studies focus only on men. While, in principle, all these studies 
analysed the RoRtE in similar labour markets and with a comparable institutional structure, 
nonetheless they retrieved different RoRtE estimates. Harmon and Walker (1995) was in fact 
criticized by Card (1999) for not adequately controlling for the underlying trends in schooling 
achievement and earnings across the different cohorts in their sample; Oreopoulos (2006) and 
Devereux and Hart (2010) both estimate a fuzzy RD model using a fourth-order polynomial of year 
of birth to control for the underlying heterogeneity (in both schooling achievement and earnings) of 
the sample across the years of the data4. Following Lee and Lemieux’s (2010) and Gelman and 
Imbens’ (2014) recommendations, we test the robustness of RD analysis to the choice of alternative 
polynomials in the running variable. Failing to use a regression specification which fully nets out for 
underlying trends and extraneous influences on the schooling decision - and its impact on future 
earnings - might explain the divergent findings observed in this literature. 
This study makes two contributions. Firstly we re-assess the robustness of the key contributions from 
Great Britain, namely Harmon and Walker (1995), Oreopoulos (2006) and Devereux and Hart (2010). 
Due to the historically high dropout rates in Great Britain, and the remarkable effect of these policies 
on overall schooling attainment, this constitutes a particularly suitable context for the investigation 
of how robust existing RoRtE estimates are to the choice of the polynomial to specify trends in 
education and earnings over time. Using all the available survey years from the General Household 
Survey (GHS) and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) data, which were used in the reviewed 
studies, we examine the sensitivity of the results to the specification of the relevant earnings function 
and the sample used. In contrast to previous papers, we devote particular attention to controlling for 
the underlying trends in schooling and earnings. We seek the optimal specification of the relevant 
earnings function using Akaike’s criterion. We also test the robustness of previous results to the use 
of nonparametric estimation techniques in the presence of an RD design. Our replication suggests 
how these heterogeneous results can be reconciled. We find that previous estimates of the returns to 
compulsory education are sensitive to the functional form chosen. The use of different-order 
polynomials results in significant differences in the estimated RoRtE.  
                                                          
4 Harmon and Walker (1995), in contrast, do not control for any polynomial in the date of birth. 
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Having documented the sensitivity of previous estimates to trend specification, in the second part of 
our analysis we define a more precise 2SLS strategy that takes into account all ROSLA reforms 
implemented in Great Britain in the post-World War II period. We do this in two ways: first, we 
calculate a multivalued IV that reflects the exogenously induced extra compulsory schooling that 
different cohorts of pupils actually faced. Second, we instrument the schooling decision of pupils 
using a set of mutually exclusive dummies for the 1947, 1963 and 1972 reforms, again reflecting the 
exogenously induced extra compulsory schooling faced by different pupils over time. Compared to 
our first approach, use of mutually exclusive dummies for different ROSLA reforms appears 
complementary, as it does not constrain the effects on schooling and earnings to be the same for the 
different ROSLA reforms. These reforms affected different complier groups, both in terms of size 
and therefore, potentially, also in terms of unobserved characteristics and tastes for education. The 
1947 ROSLA affected half the relevant cohort, whereas the 1972 ROSLA affected between a quarter 
and a third of the cohort; this implies that the complier group to this latter reform only includes the 
third of the cohort who do not have the ability or desire to continue in school beyond 15. Since the 
relevant compulsory schooling changes depended on month-year-of-birth, in contrast with the 
previous literature, our approaches also incorporate the additional variation within year-of-birth 
cohorts in the school leaving dates implied by these reforms. Our IVs attempt to add precision to the 
description of the exogenously induced amount of compulsory schooling implied by all ROSLA 
reforms in 1947, 1963 and 1972. We use all of these three reforms in order to exploit the entire 
variation in the data (in order to retrieve more robust and precise estimates), and we control in several 
different ways for the underlying trends in education and earnings.  
The main conclusion of our empirical research is that the RoRtE based on the ROSLA reforms in the 
UK is 6 percent for males; the choice of alternative polynomial terms to measure the underlying 
trends in education and earnings appears important in the determination of the results. This conclusion 
holds also when we use our new instrumental variable or the set of mutually exclusive dummies in 
our analysis. However, our new estimates do appear more robust compared to those we replicate from 
previous studies. Since we use different ROSLA reforms to instrument the schooling decision of 
pupils, we interpret our calculated RoRtE as a weighted average of the Marginal Policy Relevant 
Treatment Effect (MPRTE) estimates of these different ROSLA reforms. In the next section we define 
our terms and review the estimation problem involved in determining the RoRtE. In section II we 
examine the ROSLA reforms implemented in Britain from the World War II onwards. In section III 
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we review the existing literature on the returns to compulsory education in Britain. In section IV we 
describe the strategy employed in our replication analysis and demonstrate the specification 
sensitivity of some previous estimates of the returns to education. In section V we present our 
proposed 2SLS alternative, with our redefined instrumental variables. In section VI we conclude. 
I. Analysis of the Rate of Return to Education 
Following the notation of Carneiro et al. (2011), for ease of exposition we define the standard 
simplified Mincer earnings equation as: 
(1)  𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆 + 𝜖 
where Y is the log wage, S indicates schooling years and 𝜖 is a residual. Define potential outcomes 𝑌1 
and 𝑌0 as earnings with 𝑠 = 1 if an extra year of schooling is undertaken, and 𝑠 = 0 otherwise: 
(2)  𝑌0 = 𝜇0(𝑋) + 𝑢0      and     𝑌1 = 𝜇1(𝑋) + 𝑢1 
where 𝑋 is the set of relevant exogenous covariates and 
(3)  𝜇𝑠(𝑋) = 𝐸{𝑌𝑠|𝑋 = 𝑥}          ∀ 𝑠 = 0,1 
The return to schooling is: 
(4)  𝑌1 − 𝑌0 = 𝛽 = 𝜇1(𝑋) − 𝜇0(𝑋) + 𝑢1 − 𝑢0 
and we can define the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of a year of schooling as: 
(5)  ?̅?(𝑥) = 𝐸(𝛽|𝑋 = 𝑥) = 𝜇1(𝑋) − 𝜇0(𝑋) 
Assuming that R=1 if the individual is subject to a ROSLA reform (of an additional year) and R=0 
otherwise, we can specify the LATE(ROSLA) as: 
(6)  𝐸{𝛽|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑅 = 1} = 𝛽 ̅(𝑥) + 𝐸(𝑢1 − 𝑢0|𝑅 = 1, 𝑋 = 𝑥) 
under the assumption that 𝑢𝑠 ⊥ 𝑅  and 𝑅 = 𝑆 + 1 
(7)  𝐸{𝛽|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑅 = 1} = 𝜇1(𝑋) − 𝜇0(𝑋) 
Carneiro et al. (2011) also define a marginal treatment effect (MTE) of education as: 
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(8)  𝑀𝑇𝐸(𝑋, 𝑉𝑠) = 𝐸(𝛽|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑉𝑠 = 𝑣𝑠), 
where 𝑉𝑠 is the cumulative distribution function of the stochastic errors in the schooling choice 
equation. In Carneiro et al.’s (2011) study, this schooling choice is endogenous and they examine the 
use of a set of IVs, Z, and use techniques analogous to propensity score matching to allow them to 
retrieve this MTE:  
(9)                       𝑀𝑇𝐸(𝑥, 𝑝) =
𝜕𝐸(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑃(𝑍) = 𝑝)
𝜕𝑝
 
where p is the probability of a discrete change in the schooling decision function. In the case of 
Carneiro et al. (2011), their estimation strategy is predicated on the presence of valid IVs and the 
conditional independence of X and Z given (𝑈0, 𝑈1, 𝑉𝑠). This set up allows them to retrieve the MTE 
as a function of the unobserved heterogeneity type 𝑉𝑠 (scaled from 0-1), where 𝑉𝑠 = 1 are the least 
likely to undertake extra schooling and 𝑉𝑠 = 0 are the most likely to undertake extra schooling. 
It is then possible to consider different policy relevant education treatments that act on Z or p and 
retrieve their marginal policy relevant treatment effects (MRPTE). In our case, our Z is R – the 
ROSLA reform, which is exogenous and not related to the schooling decision of the individual. Since 
we can observe different discrete values of R, 𝑟1, 𝑟2 … . . 𝑟𝜏 then we can approximate the MPRTE at 
the different values of the discrete values of R: 
(10)                𝑀𝑃𝑅𝑇𝐸(𝑥, 𝑟𝜏) =
𝜕𝐸(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑅 = 𝑟1, 𝑟2 … . . 𝑟𝜏)
𝜕𝑟𝜏
 
It is worth noting that, in the presence of an exogenous change in the ROSLA, the estimand of a fuzzy 
RD design can be interpreted as a weighted version of equation (7), i.e., a weighted local average 
treatment effect (LATE), where the weights reflect the ex-ante probability of the observation’s 
assignment variable being near the threshold (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010). By defining R not just as 
a binary variable, and by allowing R to take up more than two values, we can potentially retrieve not 
only the LATE(ROSLA) but also the MPRTE of education – on the assumption that different values 
of the extra, discrete elements of R are independent of 𝑢𝑠. 
A second important contribution of Carneiro et al. (2011) was to estimate the MTE function as a 
function of the unobserved heterogeneity in the schooling equation. We do not do this, as we are not 
attempting to model the endogenous schooling decision directly. However we can potentially estimate 
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the MPRTE for specific discrete values of R. Moreover, the relevance of the discrete policy changes 
to school leaving ages that we exploit in our analysis implies that we also avoid the problems of weak 
or invalid instruments often encountered in this literature5.  
II. Contextual Background and the Compulsory Schooling Law Changes 
The first major change to the age of compulsory schooling was enacted in Britain in 1947 as a result 
of the 1944 Education Act which raised the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 15. The 1944 
Education Act also gave power to the Minister of Education to raise the age of compulsory schooling 
from 15 to 16, at the earliest possible convenience. The Education Minister did so in March 1972, 
and the age of compulsory schooling was raised to 16 on September 1st 1972. Figure 1 was calculated 
on the entire British-born sample available from the 1983-1998 GHS survey years. It illustrates the 
impact of these policies on the fraction of pupils leaving school by age 14, 15 and 16 by year of birth. 
The reason for not using later GHS survey years is that no survey was held in 1999, and in that year 
the survey was redeveloped and relaunched in 2000 with a different design6. This is similar to what 
Oreopoulos (2006) and Devereux and Hart (2010) have done, and in this, as for most of our analysis, 
we follow their approach. Finally, information on month of birth is only available starting from the 
1983 GHS survey - which explains why we cannot use earlier GHS survey years7. 
                           
FIGURE 1. FRACTION LEFT FULL-TIME EDUCATION BY YEAR AGED 14, 15 AND 16                         
 (Pooled Sample, GHS 1983-98) 
It is apparent from Figure 1 that both laws had a strong and clear impact on school leaving  behaviour. 
In both 1947 and 1972, the fraction of pupils leaving school before the (new) minimum school leaving 
                                                          
5 See for example Angrist and Krueger (1991), and Clark and Royer (2013). 
6 After 1998, information on the month of birth is only reported in the GHS 2000-01. 
7 In the GHS 1983, 1984 and 1985 surveys, information on the month-year of birth was asked only to women. 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
F
ra
ct
io
n
 L
e
a
vi
n
g
 F
u
ll-
T
im
e
 E
d
u
ca
tio
n
1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Year Aged 14
By Age 14 By Age 15
By Age 16
8 
 
 
age dropped sharply; the fraction leaving school before age 15 fell from roughly 60 percent for the 
cohort that turned 14 just before April 1947 to roughly 10 percent for the cohort that turned 14 
immediately after the cutoff point. In 1972, for pupils that turned 15 at around the cutoff point, the 
change in minimum school leaving age decreased the proportion of pupils leaving school by 15 years 
of age from 35 percent to less than 10 percent. Both policies resulted in many British pupils still 
leaving education at the earliest possible convenience8. These large, exogenously induced, discrete 
changes in the fraction of children staying on at school were first used by Harmon and Walker (1995) 
in an IV estimate of the RoRtE.  
A careful analysis of the evolution of the regulations that determined the period of compulsory 
schooling in Great Britain over the post-World War II period reveals that the exposure to compulsory 
full-time education did not only vary as a result of these two reforms. There was a third reform that 
varied the term a pupil was entitled to leave school. The British education system has three terms that 
run September-December, January-April, and April-July, with precise dates varying by school and 
Local Education Authority (LEA). Until 1963, students had to stay in school until the end of the term 
in which they reached the minimum school leaving age. In 1962 a new Education Act was passed; as 
a result, starting from 1963 these laws changed, and pupils born September-January had to attend 
school until Easter, whereas those born February-August had to attend school until June. The first 
cohort to be directly affected by the 1963 reform were pupils who reached the minimum school 
leaving age in September 1963 (i.e., when the new law came into force)9. Figure 1 shows that the 
effect of this reform was only about a five percent increase in the overall staying-on rate for 15 and 
16 year olds. However, this effect is partly understated as Figure 1 looks at the whole year effects and 
not at the within-school-year term effects.  
In comparison with the cohort of pupils born before April 1st 1933, the 1947 reform resulted in 12 
additional months of compulsory schooling for pupils born from April 1st 1933 up till August 31st 
1948. Starting from those born on September 1st 1948, the interaction of the 1947 reform and 1963 
reform implied 15 additional months of compulsory schooling for the cohorts born September-
December and February-March (i.e., one more year, plus one term). Starting from September 1st 1957, 
12 additional months of compulsory schooling should be added to this: starting from those born on 
                                                          
8 This is relevant as it implies that the RoRtE retrieved from using these reforms is unlikely to capture the later effect of enrolment into higher levels of 
education. 
9 Figure A.1 in Appendix A offers a stylized description of the implications of these law changes for actual compulsory school attendance. 
9 
 
 
September 1st 1957, the 1972 reform implied 24 additional months of compulsory schooling for the 
cohorts born in January and April-August; for the cohorts born September-December and February-
March, the interaction of the 1963 reform and 1972 reform implied 27 additional months of 
compulsory schooling (i.e., two more years, plus one term)10. In all these figures the comparison is 
with the birth cohorts prior to April 1st 1933. 
The 1962 Education Act did not only vary the length of compulsory schooling for pupils born in 
certain months of the calendar year. Rather, it also required LEAs to provide a mandatory awards 
system for student maintenance grant for first degree university courses and for other courses of 
further education; it made parents legally responsible for ensuring that their children received a 
suitable education at school or otherwise, with failure to comply possibly resulting in prosecution; 
finally, it placed a legal obligation on the LEAs to ensure that pupils attended school. In part, these 
provisions may have been motivated by the willingness to induce more students to attend university. 
In part, these provisions may have also been motivated by the imperfect compliance to the 1947 
reform that appears from the visual inspection of Figure 1. While the 1947 reform raised the 
compulsory schooling age to 15, 10% of British pupils still left school by age 14 after the reform. As 
discussed in Harmon and Walker (1995), the 1947 reform imposed important constraints on 
behaviour, which were documented by contemporaneous reports of overcrowding in schools and 
labour-market shortages at the time. Nickell (1993) and Halsey et al. (1980) also discuss the 
difficulties related to the implementation of the 1947 reform. Finally, Oreopoulos (2006) also 
discusses the possible noncompliance, or delayed enforcement of the law, to explain the fact that in 
Britain a fraction of pupils was still found to leave school by age 14 after 1947. 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 use the GHS 1986-98 survey years and they show, respectively, the effects of the 
1947, 1963 and 1972 reforms on the average age when pupils in our sample left full-time education. 
Results are shown for the male cohorts that reached the minimum school leaving age close to the 
ROSLA reform of interest. The effects of the 1947 and 1972 reforms on schooling have been studied 
by previous authors. In contrast, Figure 3 newly shows the average school-leaving age of pupils across 
September 1963, when the 1962 Education Act came into force. A discontinuous increase appears in 
the school-leaving age starting from the cohort that turned 15 in September 1963. This discontinuity 
                                                          
10 The 1996 Education Act further modified this, introducing a new unique minimum-school-leaving date for all pupils in the school year in which the 
pupil turns 16. Compared to the pre-April 1933 cohorts, this reform implied 27 additional months of compulsory school for those born January-March, 
24 additional months for those born April-August, and 30 additional months for those born September-December (i.e., two more years, plus two terms). 
However, since this came into force from 1998 onwards, our sample is not affected by the provision in the 1996 Education Act. 
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is smaller than the discontinuities associated with the 1947 and 1972 reforms. Given that this reform 
newly mandated only a few additional months of compulsory schooling, this is perhaps not surprising. 
Moreover, since the cutoff in Figure 3 is calculated in September, this discontinuity may derive, in 
part, from the asymmetry between pupils born in late July and August, who were deemed to have 
attained the minimum school leaving age at the end of the summer term, i.e., before their actual 
birthday, and their counterpart born in other months.  
Nonetheless, it also appears from Figure 3 that, starting from September 1963, a higher average 
school leaving age appears to be observed in our data. It is possible that the 1963 reform, by 
mandating a few months of additional compulsory schooling for pupils born in certain months of the 
calendar year, by making parents and LEAs legally responsible for school attendance of pupils, and 
by providing a series of student grants, may have induced pupils to stay in school for longer. 
Although, in our data, we do not observe the number of terms attended by a pupil, but only the age 
when pupils left full-time education, the set of provisions in the 1962 Education Act may have 
resulted in greater compliance to the 1947 ROSLA reform, in longer time spent in school, and in 
greater desire to attend university. Moreover, it is important to notice that compulsory schooling laws 
constitute an Intention-To-Treat (ITT); in other words, they only define the minimum age required to 
leave school, but there may be non-compliance of pupils facing the law, and due consideration needs 
to be accorded to those who are deciding to stay on in school irrespective of the ROSLA. Therefore, 
it is possible that this reform may have had a detectable impact on the average school leaving age of 
British pupils that is observable in our data. This is ultimately an empirical question, which no study 
has investigated before. We rectify this omission explicitly in our regression analysis in Section V. 
Figures 5, 6 and 7 also use the GHS 1986-98 survey years, and they display respectively the effects 
of the 1947, 1963 and 1972 reforms on future earnings. The 1947 and 1972 reform effects on earnings 
have also been discussed by previous authors. Less familiar is Figure 6 that explores the effect of the 
1963 reform on earnings. Although a discontinuous trend appears across the September 1963 cutoff, 
the distribution of average earnings does not seem to differ significantly across the two sides of this 
discontinuity. This would suggest that the 1963 reform may have not had a significant effect on the 
future earnings of pupils that reached the minimum school leaving age close to the September 1963 
cutoff. This is again an empirical question, which we investigate in this study using regression 
analysis. 
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FIGURE 2. 1947 REFORM: AVERAGE AGE LEFT FULL-TIME EDUCATION BY MONTH AGED 14 
(1931-35 Birth Cohorts - Male Sample, GHS 1986-98) 
 
 
FIGURE 3. 1963 REFORM: AVERAGE AGE LEFT FULL-TIME EDUCATION BY MONTH AGED 15 
(1946-50 Birth Cohorts - Male Sample, GHS 1986-98) 
 
 
FIGURE 4. 1972 REFORM: AVERAGE AGE LEFT FULL-TIME EDUCATION BY MONTH AGED 15 
(1955-59 Birth Cohorts - Male Sample, GHS 1986-98) 
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FIGURE 5. 1947 REFORM: AVERAGE ANNUAL LOG EARNINGS BY MONTH AGED 14 
(1931-35 Birth Cohorts - Male Sample, GHS 1986-98) 
 
 
FIGURE 6. 1963 REFORM: AVERAGE ANNUAL LOG EARNINGS BY MONTH AGED 15 
(1946-50 Birth Cohorts - Male Sample, GHS 1986-98) 
 
 
FIGURE 7. 1972 REFORM: AVERAGE ANNUAL LOG EARNINGS BY MONTH AGED 15 
(1955-59 Birth Cohorts - Male Sample, GHS 1986-98) 
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In conclusion, variation in the compulsory schooling regime occurred both across year-of-birth 
cohorts and across month-of-birth cohorts, i.e., both between- and within-year-of-birth cohorts. 
Although the 1963 reform received less attention than the 1947 or the 1972 reform, it plausibly 
introduced further exogenous variation in the schooling behaviour of British pupils, especially for 
those born in specific months of the calendar year. This implies that a comprehensive analysis of the 
returns to compulsory education in Britain exploiting the observed policy changes ought to take into 
account all the changes in compulsory schooling that future generations faced, in comparison with 
the cohorts born before April 1933. Further, this also implies that the returns to schooling due to these 
reforms ought to be analyzed and estimated with month-of-birth comparisons. We exploit these 
legislative changes in the definition of our new instrumental variables in Section V. 
III. Previous Estimates of the Compulsory Schooling Law Changes 
A number of studies have analyzed the effects of the 1947 and 1972 UK ROSLA reforms on the 
earnings returns to education: namely, Harmon and Walker (1995), Oreopoulos (2006), Devereux 
and Hart (2010), Dickson and Smith (2011), Buscha and Dickson (2012), Grenet (2013), Clark and 
Royer (2013) and Dickson (2013). All these studies have adopted an IV approach exploiting UK 
government’s ROSLA reforms. 
Harmon and Walker (1995) attempt to capture the effect of both the 1947 and 1972 reforms on future 
earnings. They use data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for the survey years 1978-86, 
focusing on males aged 18-64. They adopt an IV methodology; using the cohorts of males born before 
1933 as omitted category, they define one dummy variable for pupils who entered their 14th year 
between 1947 and 1971 (therefore facing a compulsory school age of 15), and one for pupils entering 
their 14th year after 1971, who therefore faced a compulsory school age of 16. They control for a 
quadratic of age, for the administrative region and for survey year, without imposing any further 
restrictions to the sample used in the estimation. Their IV estimates suggest that the effect of an 
additional year of compulsory education on log earnings is 0.15, much larger than the OLS estimate 
of 0.0611. 
Oreopoulos (2006) uses the 1983–98 survey years from the General Household Survey (GHS) and 
includes in the analysis all British-born individuals from 1921-51. He focuses on the 1947 reform 
                                                          
11 Harmon and Walker (1995) were criticized by Card (1999) for not including cohort controls in their specification. However, since they control for 
survey year, the linear age variable is in fact a linear cohort variable (Devereux and Hart, 2010). 
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using a regression discontinuity (RD) approach and includes in the specification a fourth-order 
polynomial in year of birth. By including the quartic of year of birth, he attempts to control for cohort 
trends. His results are consistent with Harmon and Walker (1995), since he finds IV estimates of the 
annual gain in earnings ranging from 10 to 14 percent, irrespective of the proportion of population 
affected by the compulsory school policies and whether the result is calculated for men or for women. 
Devereux and Hart (2010) also focus on the 1947 reform; they follow Oreopoulos (2006) by 
estimating monetary returns to compulsory schooling including a quartic of year of birth and using 
similar estimation samples. Like Oreopoulos (2006), they include individuals who were born between 
1921 and 1951 and are aged between 28 and 64. They complement the GHS with the New Earnings 
Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD), which offers a large sample of high-quality administrative earnings 
data. Devereux and Hart (2010) do not find any significant returns to compulsory schooling for the 
pooled sample, whereas they find IV estimates for men that are much closer to the conventional OLS 
estimates. 
Dickson and Smith (2011) use the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS) data to exploit separately 
the 1963 reform and the 1972 reform to investigate whether an additional year of schooling is 
beneficial per se or whether qualifications are key. They focus on men, and they restrict their analysis 
to the cohorts born between September 1947 and August 1967, i.e., ten years before and after the 
1972 reform. They argue that the 1963 reform increased the likelihood of achieving academic 
qualifications, while it only affected marginally the amount of schooling received by British pupils. 
In contrast, the 1972 reform resulted both in one additional year of schooling and in an increased 
likelihood of achieving academic qualifications. Since the first cohort affected by the 1963 reform 
were pupils born in September 1948, in fact their sample restriction does not allow them to test 
whether the introduction of the 1963 reform had any effects on the average length of schooling of 
pupils. Using the different reforms, they retrieve IV estimates that are not statistically different, 
suggesting that returns to academic qualifications, rather than an additional year of schooling, 
determine most of the estimated return to additional years of compulsory schooling.  
Del Bono and Galindo-Rueda (2004, 2007) also use the 1963 reform to examine the impact of 
qualifications on future labour market outcomes. They use data from the 1993-2003 LFS, from the 
Youth Cohort Study and a dataset that combines information from the New Earnings Study and the 
Joint Unemployment and Vacancies Operating System Cohort. They focus on pupils born after the 
15 
 
 
introduction of the 1963 reform, and they document the importance of academic qualifications on 
future labour market outcomes, especially for women. Buscha and Dickson (2012) use the UK 
Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) and they focus on the effects of the 1972 reform on the 
earnings for individuals in their early 50s. They estimate the returns to secondary education on (log) 
hourly pay to be at 18.4% for the pooled sample, 22.6% for men, and 16.9% for women. Grenet 
(2013) focuses on the 1972 reform and compares the effects for future earnings of the 1972 reform in 
England and Wales with the 1967 Berthoin reform in France. He uses large samples from the UK 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) and, like previous RD analyses, includes in the specification a fourth-
order polynomial of year of birth. He concludes that, unlike the 1967 Berthoin reform in France, the 
ROSLA intervention in England and Wales resulted in significant increases in future earnings for 
pupils forced to stay in school. He attributes this discrepancy mostly to the fact that the new school-
leaving age implied the obtainment of a certificate in Britain, whereas the same was not true in France. 
Clark and Royer (2013) investigate the health returns to compulsory schooling. Focusing on both the 
1947 and 1972 law changes, they fail to find any significant impact of the compulsory schooling 
reforms on health outcomes; however, they also conclude that the 1947 reform increased earnings by 
roughly 8 log points. Unlike previous studies, they use month-of-birth comparisons and include a 
quartic of month-year of birth. However, in the calculation of their IV, they do not take into account 
the within-year-of-birth variation in the exposure to the 1963 reform12. Finally, using data from the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), Dickson (2013) compares RoRtE results retrieved by 
exploiting the 1972 ROSLA reform with results retrieved using variations in schooling associated 
with early smoking behaviour. He finds IV estimates of 10.2% when he uses the 1972 ROSLA reform, 
12.9% when using early smoking and 12.5% when both instruments are used simultaneously. 
IV. Replication Analysis 
Among the reviewed studies, all those that estimate an RD design specify a quartic polynomial of the 
assignment variable, but only Grenet (2013) and Clark and Royer (2013) test it against alternative 
specifications, such as a local linear regression. Based on the suggestion in Lee and Lemieux (2010), 
in this section we test the sensitivity of the results reported in Harmon and Walker (1995), Oreopoulos 
                                                          
12 In other words, these authors still define a dichotomous IV that only takes the value 1 or 0.  
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(2006) and Devereux and Hart (2010) to two important factors: namely, their sensitivity across 
alternative specifications and across comparable datasets. 
For this replication analysis we use both the GHS and the FES data. From the GHS, we use four 
separate subsets of data: namely, the GHS 1979-1998 survey years as in Devereux and Hart (2010), 
the GHS 1983-1998 survey years as in Oreopoulos (2006), the GHS 1979-1986, similarly to Harmon 
and Walker (1995)13 and, finally, the 1979-2006 GHS survey years (i.e., all the GHS survey years 
publicly available at the time of writing)14. In our replication analysis we analyze the effect of the 
1947 reform. For this analysis, we follow Oreopoulos (2006) and Devereux and Hart (2010) by 
including British-born individuals who were born between 1921 and 1951 and are aged between 28 
and 64. When we introduce our new 2SLS strategy in the next section, since this exploits the 
exogenous variation in schooling induced by the 1947, 1963 and 1972 reforms, we use British-born 
individuals who were born between 1921 and 1965 and are aged between 28 and 64. In contrast, when 
we do the analysis on the GHS 1979-1986, in order to produce estimates comparable to Harmon and 
Walker (1995) we follow these authors, i.e., no cohort restrictions are imposed in this case, and we 
include all available individuals aged 18-6415. Finally, results are presented and discussed for the 
male subsample16. In our main specification, the first stage equation can be written as follows:  
(11)    𝐸𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 𝑔0 + 𝑔1𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖 + 𝑔2(𝑌𝑜𝐵𝑖)
𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖, 
where 𝑖 indexes individuals, 𝐸𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 represents age left school, Law is a dummy variable indicating 
if the ROSLA has changed, and 𝑔2(𝑌𝑜𝐵𝑖) is a polynomial function of order 𝑛 of year of birth. In the 
reduced form specification we model log weekly earnings on the 𝐿𝑎𝑤 variable and a polynomial 
function of order 𝑛 of year of birth. Formally, 
(12)   𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑣0 + 𝑣1𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖 + 𝑣2(𝑌𝑜𝐵𝑖)
𝑛 + 𝜃𝑖 , 
where 𝑖 indexes individuals, 𝑌𝑖 represents weekly earnings and 𝑣2(𝑌𝑜𝐵𝑖) is a polynomial function of 
order 𝑛 of year of birth. This polynomial is necessary to control for the underlying heterogeneity (in 
                                                          
13 We also use the FES 1978-86 survey years in order to replicate exactly Harmon and Walker’s (1995) results. The results of this exercise are discussed 
later in this section. 
14 However, as Devereux and Hart (2010) notice, no survey was held in 1999. In that year, the survey was redeveloped and relaunched in 2000 with a 
different design. For this reason, when we define our new 2SLS strategy and compare it to previous estimates in Section V, we only focus on GHS 
survey years until 1998. 
15 Table A.1 in Appendix A reports the descriptive statistics from the GHS on the key variables used in the econometric analysis. Table A.2 in Appendix 
A reports descriptive statistics from the FES 1978-86 survey years, similarly to those reported in Harmon and Walker (1995). 
16 Results for the pooled sample are available from the authors upon request. 
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both schooling achievement and earnings) of the sample across the years of the data. Finally, 2SLS 
estimates are derived in order to retrieve the impact of compulsory schooling on earnings. The only 
exception to our main specification applies to the analysis of the GHS 1979-86 survey years; since 
here we present estimates comparable to Harmon and Walker (1995), we accordingly add regional 
dummies and survey year dummies to the specifications above. 
In our specifications we replicate Harmon and Walker (i.e., using the GHS 1979-86), we set to 
missing cases for which hourly wage observations are less than £1 or more than £150 (in December 
2001 pounds), we exclude cases where weekly hours are greater than 84, less than 1, or missing, and 
we estimate robust standard errors, allowing for clustering by birth cohort. All specifications also 
include controls for age; similarly to Oreopoulos (2006) and Devereux and Hart (2010), some 
specifications include a quartic function of age, while some include age dummies. Following Harmon 
and Walker (1995) and Heckman and Polachek (1974), we also estimate the analysis including a 
quadratic of age. Unlike previous parametric RD estimates of the returns to compulsory schooling, 
we do not restrict the polynomial function of year of birth to be a quartic, i.e., a fourth-order 
polynomial. Rather, following the recommendation of Lee and Lemieux (2010), we perform the IV 
analysis for polynomials of up to order six. Moreover, unlike the previous parametric RD estimates 
that we replicate here, we also interact the Law dummy with the (𝑌𝑜𝐵𝑖) polynomial for each order 𝑛 
of year of birth to allow for heterogeneous functions either sides of the discontinuity. This is in fact 
one further test of the sensitivity of previous RoRtE estimates to equation specification17. The 
estimates are very similar to those shown here and are available from the authors on request. 
Tables 1 and 2 report the IV estimates from our replication analysis using the GHS data for the male 
sample18. Table 1 presents the IV estimates from our parametric analysis; Table 2 presents the 
estimates from our local regression approach, where we use only observations close to the threshold. 
In our parametric analysis, using the GHS 1979-1998 survey years and including a quartic function 
of year-of-birth in the analysis, we are able to replicate the analysis of Devereux and Hart (2010). 
Using the 1983-98 GHS survey years as in Oreopoulos (2006) and controlling for a quartic function 
of year-of-birth, we can replicate the results reported in Devereux and Hart (2010) when using 
Oreopoulos’ (2006) sample data19. Using the 1979-86 GHS survey years, we implement the analysis 
                                                          
17 We thank the editor of Labour Economics for suggesting this. 
18 Table C.1 in Appendix C reports additional estimates for the male sample. 
19 We do not report directly the replication of the results in Oreopoulos (2006) because this author later wrote a corrigendum for Oreopoulos (2006). 
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using the same econometric strategy as in Harmon and Walker (1995), in order to test the robustness 
of their findings to the use of different sample data. For reasons of space, we show the results of this 
last exercise, as well as the results when using our new larger GHS dataset in Table C.1 in Appendix 
C. 
TABLE 1. 1ST STAGE AND 2SLS EFFECTS OF ROSLA LAWS ON SCHOOLING AND LOG WEEKLY EARNINGS – MALE SAMPLE 
2
S
L
S
 E
st
im
at
es
 
       
One -0.020   -0.017 -0.017 -0.042 -0.041 -0.054 
   (0.026) (0.027)  (0.027)   (0.034) (0.037) (0.040) 
Two 0.031*     0.034*   0.039* 0.005 0.012 0.006 
    (0.017) (0.017)  (0.022)   (0.033) (0.032) (0.035) 
Three 0.019 0.020 0.023 0.006 0.007 0.003 
    (0.021) (0.021)  (0.026)   (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) 
Four     0.063**       0.061**   0.067** 0.062 0.060 0.064 
    (0.026) (0.026)  (0.031)   (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) 
Five     0.061**      0.060** 0.067** 0.064 0.062 0.069 
   (0.028) (0.029) (0.033)   (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) 
Six      0.096***       0.097***    0.102***    0.114*  0.115*   0.125** 
   (0.034) (0.035) (0.036)    (0.056) (0.058) (0.058) 
       
F
ir
st
-S
ta
g
e 
E
st
im
at
es
 
       
One       0.546***       0.545***    0.546***      0.496***        0.485***     0.484*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) 
Two       0.553***       0.551***    0.553***      0.500***        0.493***     0.492*** 
    (0.037)  (0.037)   (0.038)  (0.058)   (0.057)   (0.057) 
Three        0.572***      0.575***     0.577***      0.535***        0.526***     0.525*** 
     (0.039)   (0.040) (0.040) (0.051)    (0.051)   (0.050) 
Four        0.470***    0.471*** 0.469*** 0.427***     0.429*** 0.433*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) 
Five     0.471***   0.471*** 0.469*** 0.425***     0.427*** 0.432*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.041) (0.040) (0.043) 
Six     0.459***  0.458*** 0.462*** 0.423***     0.424*** 0.434*** 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.050) (0.050) (0.053) 
       
Age  Controls         Quadratic Quartic  Dummies   Quadratic    Quartic Dummies 
NOTE. - D&H is Devereux and Hart (2010) and O is Oreopoulos (2006). Estimates in columns (2) and (3) when using a 4th order 
YoB polynomial are those replicated from previous papers. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
The 2SLS estimates in the upper panel of Table 1 appear sensitive to the trend specification. Using 
higher-order polynomial controls results in both higher point estimates and greater statistical 
significance in the estimated effects. One plausible interpretation of this might be that, by estimating 
higher-order polynomials, greater weight is being placed on later cohorts of individuals. This would 
be in line with Gelman and Imbens’ (2014) suggestion that use of higher-order polynomials in RD 
 Order YoB 
Polynomial 
GHS 1979-1998 (D&H) GHS 1983-1998 (O) 
(1)    (2) (3) (4)     (5)          (6) 
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analysis places greater weight on observations away from the discontinuity, and it may also result in 
a greater likelihood of finding statistical significance in the estimated effects.  
Nonetheless, an analysis of our first stage estimates suggests that both low and high order polynomials 
allow us to robustly isolate the effect of this reform. These are reported in the lower panel of Table 
1. In all cases, our first stage estimates suggest that using low- or high-order polynomials would yield 
reliable and statistically-significant estimates. This reflects the relevance of the 1947 reform, but it 
also shows that the sensitivity in the 2SLS estimates that we find cannot be explained by problems of 
weak or invalid instruments. Regardless of whether higher- or lower-order polynomials are chosen to 
describe the underlying heterogeneity in schooling and earnings of the sample across the years of the 
data, starting from the quartic function chosen by the previous literature, relatively modest deviations 
from the chosen order of the polynomial seem to affect the calculation of the RoRtE. This applies to 
all datasets considered - including our own20. 
TABLE 2. AIC CALCULATED FOR IV MODELS – MALE SAMPLE 
 Devereux and Hart (2010) Oreopoulos (2006) 
 Order YoB  
Polynomial 
AIC AIC 
         
1947 Reform 
       
1 74844 74648 74611 52277 52204 52841 
2 71475 71288 71077 50322 50192 50310 
3 72183 72140 71946 50298 50267 50430 
4 69893 69965 69716 48540 48650 48510 
5 69973 70045 69712 48485 48590 48378 
6 68863 68824 68289 47701 47269 47387 
       
                                                                   Age controls Quadratic Quartic Dummies Quadratic Quartic Dummies 
Notes: Estimates in bold are AIC estimates that apply to those replicated from Devereux and Hart (2010). 
  
In light of these results, and in an attempt to understand which model is preferable, we retrieved the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for each of these models, and the result of this exercise is shown 
in Table 221. If one model looked clearly superior to others, then the choice of one specification (and 
in turn, one estimated RoRtE) over the others would appear justified. However, from the results in 
                                                          
20 See Table C.1 in Appendix C. 
21 Table C.2 in Appendix C shows the AIC results for the 2SLS estimates in Table C.1 in Appendix C.  
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Table 2 considerable uncertainty still remains, as no model appears clearly superior to others. 
Differences in the AIC do emerge across models, but not in an order of magnitude necessary to 
confidently choose one model and rule out alternative options. Starting again from the quartic 
function chosen by the previous literature, relatively modest deviations from the chosen order of the 
polynomial seemingly result in different answers in the IV estimates, but not in the AIC values. This 
makes it hard to determine what RoRtE estimate can be believed. 
TABLE 3. LOCAL AVERAGE RD EFFECTS OF ROSLA LAWS ON SCHOOLING AND LOG WEEKLY EARNINGS – MALE SAMPLE 
  (Our Own) (D&H) (O) (H&W) 
1
9
4
7
 R
ef
o
rm
 
 
Wald – optimal bandw. 
 
0.066** 
 
0.066** 
 
0.202** 
 
-0.033 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.102) (0.034) 
Wald – 0.5 * optimal bandw. 0.050 0.050 0.000 0.000 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wald – 2 * optimal bandw. 0.068* 0.066* 0.128 -0.058 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.080) (0.049) 
NOTE. - D&H is Devereux and Hart (2010), O is Oreopoulos (2006) and H&W is Harmon and Walker (1995). 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Table 3 shows our Local Average RD Wald estimates. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors were 
clustered by year-of-birth, and 1,000 bootstrap replications were conducted for inference. Starting 
from an optimal bandwidth (in the sense of Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012), results are also shown 
for observations within half the optimal bandwidth and observations within twice the optimal 
bandwidth. The running variable is still the year of birth, and the optimal bandwidth was at least 
greater than two year-of-birth cohorts in almost all cases22. Local regression estimates appear partially 
consistent with the results in Table 1. In fact, we retrieve a 6% RoRtE estimate, both when we use 
our larger dataset and when we use Devereux and Hart’s (2010) data. Use of the Oreopoulos’ (2006) 
dataset results in a 20% RoRtE estimate, while use of GHS survey years similar to Harmon and 
Walker’s (1995) dataset results in a different RoRtE estimate for the compliers to the 1947 ROSLA 
(although in this case the small size of the optimal bandwidth may explain the lack of significance in 
the result). Local Average RD Wald estimates do not appear robust to modifications of the chosen 
bandwidth; however, caution is needed in the interpretation of the estimates derived using 
observations within half the optimal bandwidth in Table 3. This is because the small number of 
                                                          
22 The only case in which the optimal bandwidth turned out to be marginally smaller than two year-of-birth cohorts is the Local RD analysis of the 1947 
ROSLA using the GHS sample similar to Harmon and Walker’s (1995) sample. 
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observations may result in lack of power, or even introduce bias due to the presence of seasonality 
by month of birth. It is also important to notice that we have only a few clusters here, therefore our 
cluster-robust standard errors may be underestimated and this may potentially explain some of the 
significance in the estimates in Table 3.  
TABLE 4. 1ST STAGE AND 2SLS EFFECTS OF ROSLA LAWS ON SCHOOLING AND LOG HOURLY EARNINGS - MALE SAMPLE 
  1st Stage: Schooling 2SLS: Hourly Earnings 
 
ROSLA 
reform (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Row 1 1947 0.539*** 0.673*** 0.675*** 0.154*** 0.091*** 0.087*** 
H&W   (0.055) (0.064) (0.073)  (0.016)        (0.018) (0.020) 
 1972 0.109 0.649*** 0.687***    
  (0.077) (0.089) (0.099)    
Row 2 1947 0.539*** 0.673*** 0.675*** 0.154*** 0.091*** 0.087*** 
Clustered Standard Errors   (0.105) (0.132) (0.142)  (0.030)        (0.018) (0.016) 
 1972 0.109 0.649*** 0.687***    
  (0.180) (0.152) (0.164)    
Row 3 1947 0.607*** 0.665*** 0.655*** 0.019        0.044* 0.031 
Quartic of Year of Birth  (0.170) (0.169) (0.169)  (0.032)        (0.022) (0.027) 
 1972 0.504*** 0.654*** 0.693***    
  (0.163) (0.163) (0.173)    
Row 4 1947 0.609*** 0.668*** 0.641*** 0.024       0.052** 0.033 
Regional & Year Dummies   (0.173) (0.175) (0.173)  (0.031)       (0.021) (0.026) 
Omitted 1972 0.531*** 0.687*** 0.714***    
  (0.168) (0.167) (0.174)    
        
Age Controls  Quadratic Quartic Dummies Quadratic Quartic Dummies 
NOTE. - Estimates in row 1 and columns (1) and (4) are those replicated from their paper. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Finally, using the FES 1978-86 survey years, we replicate exactly Harmon and Walker’s (1995) 
results. Since these authors use both the 1947 and 1972 ROSLA reforms to instrument the school-
leaving age of pupils, Table 4 displays the first stage estimates for both reforms and the resulting 
2SLS estimates of education on earnings. In addition to replicating Harmon and Walker (1995), we 
also move progressively towards the specification in Devereux and Hart (2010), to test the stability 
of their results not only across sampling datasets, but also across different specifications. In the 
analysis of the FES data, we follow Harmon and Walker (1995) and we use hourly earnings (rather 
than weekly earnings) to measure the returns to schooling. Using a quadratic of age and focusing 
exclusively on the male sample, an accurate replication of their estimate is reported in Table 4, row 
1, columns (1) and (4). However, this result critically depends on the age controls used, and on the 
inclusion of controls for the birth cohort. In fact, when the specification of Devereux and Hart (2010) 
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is applied to the FES 1978-86 survey data, the results change significantly; once again, the 2SLS 
estimates appear sensitive to the chosen functional form. This provides support to Card’s (1999) 
criticism of Harmon and Walker (1995) regarding adequate controls for systematic inter-cohort 
changes in educational attainment and earnings. 
Reflecting on these results, we suggest that trend specification can play an important role in the 
estimation of the RoRtE. Our analysis suggests that previous LATE estimates are especially sensitive 
which indicates that, even in contexts where clear and persuasive sources of identification are 
available, trend specification can play an important role in the determination of the IV results. Since 
we do not have a satisfactory way of choosing the optimal order of the estimated polynomial (Gelman 
and Imbens, 2014), our analysis demonstrates the importance of reporting goodness-of-fit tests and 
checking the robustness of RD analysis to alternative polynomials.  
V. Alternative 2SLS Strategies 
In this section we attempt to retrieve more robust estimates of the RoRtE by exploiting the 1947 and 
1972 reforms in conjunction with one additional reform, namely the 1963 reform. As discussed in 
Section II, the 1963 reform introduced a number of relevant provisions that may have exogenously 
influenced the schooling decisions of British pupils. Namely, it required LEAs to provide a set of 
student maintenance grants for first degree university courses and for other courses of further 
education, it made parents legally accountable for school attendance of their children, and it made the 
LEAs legally responsible for school attendance of resident pupils. Moreover, by varying the school-
leaving dates for pupils born in certain months of the calendar year, de facto the 1963 reform exposed 
certain pupils to greater length of compulsory schooling than others. The 1963 reform introduced 
further exogenous variation in the de facto exposure to compulsory schooling for British pupils – both 
between- and within-year-of-birth cohorts. By making month-year-of-birth comparisons, rather than 
year-of-birth comparisons23, we attempt to define a more accurate IV which incorporates the variation 
both between- and within-year-of-birth implied by the school-leaving dates discussed above. 
Compared to the instruments in the existing literature, our IV reflects more precisely the amount of 
extra-compulsory schooling that different cohorts of pupils faced in Britain in our sample period.  
                                                          
23 Clark and Royer (2013) is the first study to do so, although their focus is on health outcomes. 
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In our analysis we adopt two 2SLS approaches based on a cardinal measure of how much ‘extra’ 
compulsory education later cohorts of pupils were mandated relative to the pre-April 1933 cohorts. 
Firstly, we define a new multivalued IV that takes the value 0 for pupils born before April 1st 1933 
(i.e., our control group); it takes the value 1 for pupils born from April 1st 1933 until August 31st 1948, 
since these pupils were forced to attend one more year of school. For pupils born from September 1st 
1948 up until August 31st 1957, the instrument takes the value 1.33 for those born September-
December, as well as for those born February-March; instead, it still takes up value 1 for those born 
in the remainder of the calendar year. This is because, as a result of the 1947 reform and the 1963 
reform, pupils born September-December and pupils born February-March were forced to attend one 
more year of school plus one term, in comparison with the control group. On the contrary, the length 
of compulsory schooling faced by pupils born in the remainder of the calendar year was not directly 
affected by the 1963 reform. Starting from September 1st 1957, our instrument takes the value 2; 
however, for those born September-December, as well as for those born February-March, the 
instrument takes the value 2.33; this is because, as a result of the 1972 reform and the 1963 reform, 
these pupils were forced to attend two more years of school plus one term, in comparison with the 
control group. 
Secondly, we define a set of mutually exclusive dummies for each value of our new multivalued IV. 
This results in the use of four separate dichotomous IVs to instrument the endogenous schooling 
decision. As discussed in our introduction, definition of one unique IV assumes an homogeneous 
effect of our ROSLA reforms on the schooling decisions and future earnings of British pupils. Yet 
the 1947 reform affected approximately half the relevant cohort; the 1963 reform affected a smaller 
fraction of population, especially those born in specific months of the calendar year; the 1972 reform 
took place 25 years after the 1947 reform, and it affected approximately a third of the relevant cohort. 
Given that these reforms took place at different points in time, and in all likelihood they affected 
different fractions of population, the assumption of homogeneity in their first-stage and reduced-form 
effects may be questionable. By defining a set of mutually exclusive dummies for each value of our 
multivalued IV, we relax this assumption and we allow for heterogeneous effects of these reforms on 
education and earnings. This, in turn, also allows us to newly test explicitly if the 1963 reform had 
any detectable impact on the school leaving behaviour of British pupils. The reason for showing 
results using both approaches is twofold; first, both approaches seem sensible a priori, while the 
heterogeneity in the effects of the ROSLA reforms on schooling and earnings is an empirical question. 
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Secondly, a comparison of our 2SLS estimates using both approaches allows us to assess the 
relevance of this potential heterogeneity for the retrieved RoRtE estimates. 
At this juncture, it should be noticed that our 2SLS approaches aim to describe more accurately than 
previous studies the length of compulsory schooling faced by different cohorts of pupils. For this 
reason, we only use the 1963 reform to describe the further between- and within-year of birth variation 
in the length of compulsory schooling introduced by this reform. An alternative strategy would have 
been to include in the same group all pupils born between September 1948 and August 1957, i.e., all 
those exposed to the 1947 and 1963 reform, but not to the 1972 reform. We did not do this because 
our interest in this study lies in the implications for the RoRtE estimates of a more precise description 
of the length of compulsory schooling as an instrument for the educational choice – not in the effect 
of the 1963 reform per se. Therefore, we thought it preferable to describe with our IV the effect that 
this reform had on the length of compulsory schooling. Conceptually, this also provides more direct 
comparability of our new results in this section with our replication analysis in Section IV24. 
                          
 FIGURE 8. STYLIZED DESCRIPTION OF OUR INSTRUMENT VIS-À-VIS INSTRUMENTS USED IN REVIEWED LITERATURE 
 
Figure 8 graphs our instrument against those used in Harmon and Walker (1995), Oreopoulos (2006) 
and Devereux and Hart (2010). There is no major difference between our instrument and those of 
Oreopoulos (2006) and Devereux and Hart (2010) for the 1921-1947 birth cohorts; however, for the 
                                                          
24 When we define a dummy variable for all cohorts that reached the minimum school leaving age after the introduction of the 1963 reform, the first-
stage effect of the 1963 reform on schooling appears even stronger than the first-stage estimates of the 1963 reform presented in this study. The first-
stage estimates of the 1963 reform presented in this study only apply to pupils born in September-December and February-March of the year-of-birth 
cohorts affected by the 1963 reform.  
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1948-1951 cohorts, neither Oreopoulos (2006) nor Devereux and Hart (2010) take into account the 
provisions of the 1963 reform – since we do, for these years our instrument diverges from theirs25. 
Harmon and Walker (1995) capture the changes in compulsory schooling with two dummies26; by 
doing so, they also omit to account for the 1963 reform. This may have introduced measurement error 
in the calculation of the RoRtE, and our instrument attempts to explore the relevance of this. Finally, 
it is also important to emphasize that we are not, per se, using the month of birth as our IV – rather 
our IV is derived by the conjunction of a month and year of birth and exactly what ROSLA reform 
may have affected each individual27. The strength of this approach is to emphasize the continuous 
nature of years of education and its separate terms as partly completed exogenous years of education. 
We are aware of the limitations of adding extra years or terms of education together from different 
eras, as they may be very heterogeneous across time – i.e., a term of extra education in 1963 may not 
be the same as one third of a year in 1947 or 1972. However, the inclusion of a variety of polynomials 
at the year-of-birth or at the month-year-of-birth level aims to control precisely for these 
heterogeneous effects. In our econometric analysis, the first stage equation can be written as follows:  
(13)  𝐸𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾3(𝐷𝑜𝐵𝑖)
𝑛 + 𝑢𝑖, 
where 𝑖 indexes individuals, 𝐸𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 represents age left school, 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑖 is our new multivalued IV (set 
of IVs) that captures all ROSLA reforms and 𝛾3(𝐷𝑜𝐵𝑖) is a polynomial function of order 𝑛 of date 
of birth; we estimate polynomials at the year-of-birth level, as well as at the month-year-of-birth level. 
Age controls are also included among the covariates. Finally, 𝑋𝑖 represents varying sets of additional 
controls at the individual level that are included to test for the sensitivity of our estimates to equation 
specification. In the 2SLS specification we model log weekly earnings on the instrumented age left 
school, a polynomial function of order 𝑛 of date of birth, controls for age, and a set of additional 
controls at the individual level. Formally: 
(14)  𝑙𝑛 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿2(𝐸𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑖) + 𝛿3(𝐷𝑜𝐵𝑖)
𝑛 + 𝑤𝑖, 
                                                          
25 After the 1951 cohort, a comparison between our IV and their IVs is not possible since they do not include later cohorts in the analysis. 
26 In Harmon and Walker’s (1995) IVs some overlapping is observed close to the threshold years because of the inclusion of the Scottish sample in 
their analysis; since Scotland came under a different regulation, and the 1947 and 1972 policies were implemented, respectively, in 1946 and 1976, 
Harmon and Walker (1995) attribute the policy changes to 1946 and 1976 for the Scottish sample. 
27 Following Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) there is a large literature now which uses month of birth directly as an IV 
in education studies as well as other fields. The logical potential endogeneity problem with this literature is that there may be non-random seasonality 
in this month of birth which induces effects on education outcomes or even on earnings directly. See Buckles and Hungerman (2013). Despite the fact 
that we do not use the month of birth directly as an IV, we show in Appendix B that our data does not exhibit this seasonality (despite the significance 
of the single month of August). 
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where 𝑖 indexes individuals, 𝑌𝑖 represents weekly earnings, 𝐸𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑖 represents the 
instrumented level of education and 𝛿3(𝐷𝑜𝐵𝑖) is a polynomial function of order 𝑛 of date of birth; as 
we do in the first stage, we estimate polynomials at the year-of-birth level, as well as at the month-
year-of-birth level. In our specifications, we also include varying sets of additional controls 𝑋𝑖 at the 
individual level to test for the sensitivity of our estimates to equation specification. 
Since information on month of birth was not available from the FES, here we only use data from the 
1983-1998 GHS surveys. Our sample comprises all individuals born in Britain from 1921-1965, and 
aged 28-64 at the time of the survey. Also, we still set to missing cases for which hourly wage 
observations are less than £1 or more than £150 (in December 2001 pounds), we exclude cases where 
weekly hours are greater than 84, less than 1, or missing, and we estimate robust standard errors, 
allowing for clustering by year- or by month-year of birth (according to which polynomial is 
estimated). This results in a sample of 117,144 individuals; 76,935 of these reported complete 
information on the month-year of birth, as well as on the month-year of the interview. 
Table 5 reports our IV estimates for the male sample. All results in Table 5 are calculated using (year-
of-birth or month-year-of-birth) polynomials of order four. We respectively report the estimations 
using the old dichotomous IV from Harmon and Walker (1995), that omits to incorporate the 1963 
reform, our new multivalued IV, which takes account of the number of each term of extra schooling 
a pupil was mandated, and finally our set of IVs, that incorporates the effect of the 1963 reform on 
compulsory schooling and allows for heterogeneous effects of the ROSLA reforms. 
Similarly to Table 1, in Table 5 different columns display RoRtE estimates using different controls 
for age. In the first three rows we specify the same functional form as Devereux and Hart (2010) and 
Oreopoulos (2006). Therefore, we control for a polynomial of year of birth and for age. In rows four, 
five and six we apply the same functional form only to the subsample of observations that reported 
complete information on the month-year of birth, as well as on the month-year of the interview. 
Starting from row seven, we move progressively towards the specification in Clark and Royer (2013) 
(i.e., the latest contribution to this literature), including additional covariates to the 2SLS equation 
and restricting the analysis to those individuals that reported complete information on all the 
covariates included in the analysis. In an attempt to better control for the presence of seasonality, in 
rows seven, eight and nine, we also include fixed effects, namely, at the survey-year level, at the 
survey-month level, and at the month-of-birth level. Inclusion of month-of-birth fixed effects should 
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mitigate concerns regarding the presence of seasonality by month of birth in schooling achievement 
and future earnings. In rows ten, eleven and twelve, we also control for polynomials at the month-
year of birth level, still including fixed effects at the survey-year level, at the survey-month level, and 
at the month-of-birth level. Finally, in rows thirteen, fourteen and fifteen, we re-define age in months 
(i.e., not in years), therefore controlling for within-year-of-birth heterogeneity in age. We still include 
fixed effects at the survey-year level, at the survey-month level, and at the month-of-birth level28.  
TABLE 5. 2SLS EFFECTS OF ROSLA LAWS ON LOG WEEKLY EARNINGS - MALE SAMPLE, 4TH ORDER YOB/MYOB 
POLYNOMIALS 
Controls 
IV Used 
N Obs 
RoRtE Estimates 
   
Y-o-B polyn., Years of Age, as 
per D&H 
Old IV 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.033 
N=63,746 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) 
New IV 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 
N=63,084 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Set of IVs 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 
N=63,084 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Y-o-B polyn., Years of Age, as 
per D&H 
Old IV 0.080* 0.075 0.074 0.055 
N=37,963 (0.047) (0.049) (0.049) (0.055) 
New IV 0.053* 0.049 0.049 0.037 
N=37,963 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) 
Set of IVs 0.050* 0.046 0.046 0.031 
N=37,963 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) 
Y-o-B polyn., Years of Age,  
Survey Year FE, Survey Month 
FE, Month of Birth FE 
Old IV 0.082* 0.076 0.074 0.056 
N=37,963 (0.046) (0.047) (0.048) (0.053) 
New IV 0.068** 0.062* 0.062* 0.049 
N=37,963 (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.039) 
Set of IVs 0.066** 0.061* 0.060* 0.044 
N=37,963 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) 
M-Y-o-B polyn., Years of Age,  
Survey Year FE, Survey Month 
FE, Month of Birth FE 
Old IV 0.086** 0.080* 0.078* 0.060 
N=37,963 (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) 
New IV 0.069* 0.062* 0.063* 0.050 
N=37,963 (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) 
Set of IVs 0.068** 0.063* 0.062* 0.047 
N=37,963 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) 
M-Y-o-B polyn., Months of 
Age, Survey Year FE, Survey 
Month FE, Month of Birth FE, 
as per C&R 
Old IV 0.086** 0.079* 0.077*  
N=37,963 (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)  
New IV 0.068* 0.061* 0.062*  
N=37,963 (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)  
Set of IVs 0.068** 0.062* 0.061*  
N=37,963 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)  
                      Age Controls    Quadratic     Cubic    Quartic  Dummies 
NOTE. - D&H is Devereux and Hart (2010) and C&R is Clark and Royer (2013). 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
                                                          
28 When we re-define age in months, we do not include dummies for months of age, since this results into too many controls and 
overfitting of the model.   
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The 2SLS estimates in Table 5 appear robust across different specifications and they suggest that the 
average MPRTE of the ROSLA reforms in Great Britain is 6%. Moreover, despite the wide array of 
controls included in the analysis, no major differences emerge in the estimates across alternative sets 
of controls. Our IV estimates of the returns to education no longer seem to be as sensitive as previous 
estimates to the order of the polynomial of month-year of birth chosen. 
In Table 6 we vary the order of the estimated polynomials at the year-of-birth and month-year-of-
birth level respectively. By doing this, we subject our estimates to a comparable degree of scrutiny 
as we did in Table 1 for those in previous studies29. To be precise, we apply a variety of polynomials 
to the estimates in row fifteen in Table 5, where we modeled age in months, and we included fixed 
effects at the survey-year level, at the survey-month level, and at the month-of-birth level. For each 
order n of our month-year-of-birth polynomials, Table 6 also reports our first-stage estimates of each 
ROSLA reform used in our analysis. This is important as it shows that, regardless of the order of the 
polynomial chosen in our analysis, the 1963 reform had a positive and significant impact on the 
schooling decisions of British pupils. For all the reported first-stage coefficients, we also conducted 
a series of Wald tests to check whether the coefficient associated with the first-stage effect of the 
1947 reform and the coefficient associated with the additional first-stage effect of the 1963 reform 
are statistically different. In all cases we could reject the null hypothesis of equality of these first-
stage coefficients before the introduction of the 1972 reform30. These results provide evidence that 
the 1963 reform had a detectable effect on the schooling trajectories of British pupils – over and above 
the effect of the 1947 reform. After the introduction of the 1972 reform, we could reject in almost all 
our regressions the null that the coefficient associated with the 1963 and 1972 reform is equal to the 
coefficient associated with the 1972 reform only. This is again suggestive of a first-stage effect of the 
1963 reform over and above the effect of the 1972 reform for the pupils born in the months that the 
1963 reform applied to.  
The point estimates in Table 6 show substantial consistency across different orders of the month-year 
of birth polynomials used. In most cases, our results suggest that the RoRtE for men lies between 6 
and 7 percent. The only exceptions are the 2SLS estimates retrieved using month-year of birth 
polynomials of order one and two. One plausible explanation for this may be that, given the large 
number of cohorts included in our regressions (i.e., 1921-1965), first- and second-order polynomials 
                                                          
29 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this. 
30 Results for these Wald tests are available on request from the authors. 
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in month-year-of-birth may not suffice to adequately control for the underlying trends in schooling 
and earnings over time. Therefore, we again sought the optimal specification using the Akaike’s 
criterion. In this case, the AIC appeared more informative, suggesting that the models using 
polynomials of order three and four in Table 6 are preferable to those using lower order polynomials. 
Nonetheless, results from polynomials of order one and two in Table 6 further corroborate the 
conclusion in our previous section on the importance of the trend specification when conducting IV 
analysis and when important underlying heterogeneity is present in the sample. 
Interestingly, in a comparison of the IV estimates in Table 5, the introduction of our new IV, that also 
incorporates the effect of the 1963 reform, appears to result in smaller point estimates of the RoRtE 
compared to the “Old IV” approach. Not controlling for the 1963 reform results in higher and slightly 
more unstable estimates - in line with the suggestion from our replication analysis. The 2SLS 
estimates that utilize our IV instead appear more precise, and more robust to equation specification. 
Use of our set of IVs seems to bring further benefit to our estimates; in particular, point estimates 
appear always smaller and standard errors appear slightly smaller as well. This suggests that allowing 
for more flexible first-stage and reduced-form estimates of the effects of our ROSLA reforms results 
in a higher degree of precision in our estimates. As shown in Table 6, the definition of a more precise 
IV also resulted in greater robustness in the estimated parameter across different orders of the 
estimated polynomial. 
Given the importance of the age of measurement of earnings in the determination of the RoRtE 
estimates, we also re-estimated Table 5 focusing only on individuals aged 28-40, as the bias in the 
RoRtE estimates should be minimized around this age range (see Bhuller, Mogstad and Salvanes, 
2017). While results using 4th order polynomials of year-of-birth and month-year of birth appear 
smaller than those in Table 5, when using lower order polynomials, i.e., of order three or two, the 
estimated RoRtE still clusters around 7 percent for men. Given that much fewer age groups are 
included in this analysis, we regard these results as consistent with our main conclusion of a 6 percent 
RoRtE for men. 
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TABLE 6. 1ST STAGE AND 2SLS EFFECTS OF ROSLA LAWS ON SCHOOLING AND LOG WEEKLY EARNINGS – MALE SAMPLE 
Order YoB ROSLA FIRST STAGE ESTIMATES 2SLS ESTIMATES 
Polynomial Reform (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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One 
47 Reform 0.525*** 0.528*** 0.528*** -0.000 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.037) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) 
47/63 Reform 0.661*** 0.663*** 0.661***    
 (0.044) (0.046) (0.045)    
72 Reform 0.635*** 0.639*** 0.638***    
 (0.053) (0.056) (0.056)    
72/63 Reform 0.712*** 0.716*** 0.714***    
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.053)    
Two 
47 Reform 0.439*** 0.446*** 0.446*** 0.032 0.028 0.027 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) 
47/63 Reform 0.582*** 0.587*** 0.584***    
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)    
72 Reform 0.619*** 0.631*** 0.630***    
 (0.052) (0.055) (0.054)    
72/63 Reform 0.698*** 0.708*** 0.706***    
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.052)    
Three 
47 Reform 0.502*** 0.497*** 0.500*** 0.064* 0.058* 0.059* 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
47/63 Reform 0.625*** 0.621*** 0.620***    
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)    
72 Reform 0.722*** 0.712*** 0.715***    
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.057)    
72/63 Reform 0.791*** 0.781*** 0.782***    
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.055)    
Four 
47 Reform 0.537*** 0.532*** 0.532*** 0.068** 0.062* 0.061* 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
47/63 Reform 0.643*** 0.639*** 0.640***    
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)    
72 Reform 0.735*** 0.725*** 0.725***    
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)    
72/63 Reform 0.796*** 0.787*** 0.787***    
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)    
Five 
47 Reform 0.501*** 0.502*** 0.502*** 0.068 0.068 0.067 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
47/63 Reform 0.612*** 0.613*** 0.614***    
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)    
72 Reform 0.678*** 0.678*** 0.678***    
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)    
72/63 Reform 0.742*** 0.742*** 0.742***    
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)    
Six 
47 Reform 0.433*** 0.433*** 0.434*** 0.070 0.087* 0.072* 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.045) (0.050) (0.043) 
47/63 Reform 0.524*** 0.525*** 0.526***    
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)    
72 Reform 0.694*** 0.694*** 0.693***    
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)    
72/63 Reform 0.745*** 0.745*** 0.745***    
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)    
                           Age Controls        Quadratic Quartic Dummies Quadraticatic Quartic Dummies 
NOTE. - C&R is Clark and Royer (2013). 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Finally, although in our narrative we focused entirely on men, we also estimated our results for the 
pooled sample31. Regardless of the underlying functional form chosen, the estimated coefficients on 
returns to education for the pooled sample generally go to zero. It is only when second order 
polynomials are used that estimates appear significant. However, they also appear unstable across 
alternative sets of controls. We do not regard these pooled coefficients as meaningful since the 
inclusion of women in the pooled sample introduces all the other problems of women selecting 
themselves into work or making dynamic life-cycle participation and family decisions. The inherent 
difficulty of including women into the analysis without modelling the selectivity of women into work, 
as well as the problem of fertility and the dynamics of female labour supply, all conspire to make this 
problem intractable for a pooled sample. How much of our estimates for the pooled sample is due to 
education per se, rather than selection, is a moot point. Confining our interest to men only, our results 
suggest that introducing this methodology provides us with more stable coefficients. However, even 
when we use our multivalued IV, as well as our new set of IVs, we still find the specification of the 
underlying trends in education and earnings to play an important role in the determination of the 
RoRtE estimates. 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper has revisited the empirical literature on the returns to education in the UK. Courtesy of 
exogenous UK government school leaving age reforms, this is a particularly interesting setting to 
investigate this important parameter. Not surprisingly, a rich literature has flourished in this context. 
Our contribution to the debate relating to the rate of return to education is twofold. First, we examine 
the robustness of the papers by Harmon and Walker (1995), Oreopoulos (2006) and Devereux and 
Hart (2010). We do this by using all the available data and examining the sensitivity of the results to 
the specification of the polynomial used to describe the assignment variable (i.e., date of birth) away 
from the threshold. Our replication analysis attests to the sensitivity of previous RoRtE estimates to 
the specific functional form chosen. Since in reality the ‘true function’ is not known, our analysis 
highlights the importance of reporting goodness-of-fit tests and checking the robustness of RD 
analysis to alternative polynomials of the controls. Since we conduct our analysis in a context where 
multiple informative instrumental variables were available to retrieve the RoRtE, this conclusion is 
particularly relevant. 
                                                          
31 Our results are available on request to the authors. 
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Secondly, we generalize the IV approach of the previous papers by using the month of birth in 
conjunction with the ROSLA in the calculation of a more accurate IV. We do this in two ways: firstly, 
we define a new multivalued IV that reflects the extra fractions-of-a-year of schooling that later 
cohorts of pupils were mandated in comparison with the pre-April 1933 cohorts. Secondly, we also 
instrument the school leaving age of our sample observations with a set of mutually exclusive 
dummies for each value of our new multivalued IV. With the latter approach we allow the first-stage 
and reduced form effects of the ROSLA reforms to differ. Nonetheless, both approaches retrieve very 
similar results. Our analysis provides more consistency in the results with RoRtE estimates generally 
found at 6 percent. By redefining the instrument to directly reflect the extra exogenous education 
administered to the treated population, we find estimates of the RoRtE that are close to the estimates 
in Devereux and Hart (2010).  
The main conclusion of our empirical research is that the RoRtE based on the ROSLA policies in the 
UK is 6 percent for males. In contrast, we also find that the RoRtE for the pooled sample is generally 
zero. Compared to previous estimates, our results appear more robust to the inclusion of alternative 
controls; in comparison with estimates using the binary IV in Harmon and Walker (1995), use of our 
IVs shows the estimates of the RoRtE to be smaller and more precise. Nonetheless, also our RoRtE 
estimates appear sensitive to the choice of the polynomial used to describe the underlying 
unobservable trends in education and earnings in the sample: our estimates range from 5-6 percent 
and statistically significant when using polynomials of order three or four to 0-3 percent and non-
statistically significant when using polynomials of order one and two, further reflecting the 
importance of reporting goodness-of-fit tests and checking the robustness of RD analysis to 
alternative polynomials. 
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
FIGURE A.1. STYLIZED DESCRIPTION OF THE EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY SCHOOL LAWS32 
                                                          
32 Clark and Royer (2013) note that not all local schools authorities adhered to the same school entry rules: some admitted all students at the beginning of the academic year in which they reached the age 
of five (i.e., in September); others had two rather than three entry points. 
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TABLE A.1. GHS DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE STUDY OF 1947 SLA REFORM 
1947 SLA Reform GHS 1979-2006 GHS 1979-1998 GHS 1983-1998 GHS 1979-1986 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev 
Survey Year 96,549 88.13 7.24 85,766 86.29 5.30 53,502 89.57 3.90 71,388 82.26 2.32 
Cohort 96,549 20.20 8.06 85,766 19.42 8.13 53,502 20.90 7.30 71,388 23.23 12.89 
Female 96,549 0.45 0.50 85,766 0.45 0.50 53,502 0.46 0.50 71,388 0.44 0.50 
Age 96,549 47.59 8.57 85,766 46.47 8.35 53,502 48.34 7.42 71,388 38.53 12.60 
Employee 96,549 0.90 0.30 85,766 0.91 0.29 53,502 0.89 0.31 71,388 0.94 0.24 
Hours Worked 96,549 34.85 12.97 85,766 34.82 12.88 53,502 35.03 13.33 71,388 35.18 11.53 
Log (Hourly Wage) 96,549 1.91 0.59 85,766 1.88 0.58 53,502 1.94 0.60 71,388 1.77 0.52 
Log (Weekly Earnings) 96,549 5.35 0.87 85,766 5.33 0.87 53,502 5.39 0.88 71,388 5.24 0.79 
Age Left School 96,549 15.58 1.43 85,766 15.46 1.22 53,502 15.58 1.21 71,388 15.56 1.24 
Left School by Age 14 96,549 0.17 0.37 85,766 0.19 0.39 53,502 0.13 0.34 71,388 0.19 0.40 
Left School by Age 15 96,549 0.62 0.49 85,766 0.63 0.48 53,502 0.60 0.49 71,388 0.54 0.50 
Left School by Age 16 96,549 0.81 0.39 85,766 0.82 0.38 53,502 0.81 0.40 71,388 0.81 0.39 
Law mandates school until 15 96,549 0.79 0.40 85,766 0.77 0.42 53,502 0.84 0.36 71,388 0.75 0.43 
Law mandates school until 16 96,549 0 0 85,766 0 0 53,502 0 0 71,388 0.17 0.37 
Law mandates school until 15 - Different Calc for Scotland 96,549 0.79 0.40 85,766 0.77 0.42 53,502 0.84 0.36 71,388 0.75 0.43 
Law mandates school until 16 - Different Calc for Scotland    96,549           0               0   85,766          0               0 53,502 0 0 71,388 0.16 0.36 
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TABLE A.2. FES DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE JOINT STUDY OF 1947 & 1972 SLA REFORMS 
    Pooled Sample Male Sample 
Variable       Obs   Mean  Std Dev    Obs    Mean  Std. Dev. 
Ln(wage) 61,019 1.751 0.345 34,335 1.931 0.198 
Years of Schooling 61,019 16.159 2.136 34,335 16.159 2.203 
Age 61,019 38.447 12.562 34,335 38.739 12.667 
Yorkshire 61,019 0.088 0.283 34,335 0.088 0.283 
Northwest 61,019 0.112 0.315 34,335 0.110 0.312 
East Midlands 61,019 0.073 0.261 34,335 0.075 0.264 
West Midlands 61,019 0.098 0.297 34,335 0.099 0.298 
East Anglia 61,019 0.036 0.186 34,335 0.037 0.188 
Southeast 61,019 0.310 0.463 34,335 0.306 0.461 
Southwest 61,019 0.072 0.259 34,335 0.074 0.262 
Scotland 61,019 0.090 0.286 34,335 0.089 0.285 
Northern Ireland 61,019 0.014 0.118 34,335 0.014 0.115 
Wales 61,019 0.049 0.217 34,335 0.051 0.219 
Year = 1979 61,019 0.114 0.318 34,335 0.116 0.321 
Year = 1980 61,019 0.116 0.320 34,335 0.116 0.321 
Year = 1981 61,019 0.120 0.325 34,335 0.121 0.326 
Year = 1982 61,019 0.116 0.320 34,335 0.117 0.322 
Year = 1983 61,019 0.102 0.302 34,335 0.101 0.301 
Year = 1984 61,019 0.107 0.310 34,335 0.104 0.306 
Year = 1985 61,019 0.103 0.303 34,335 0.101 0.302 
Year = 1986 61,019 0.105 0.307 34,335 0.102 0.303 
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Appendix B. Analysis of Presence of Seasonality – by Month of Birth 
 
 
FIGURE B.1. SEASONALITY IN AGE LEFT FULL-TIME EDUCATION FOR COHORTS BORN IN 1921-41. MALE SAMPLE 
(A is April and S is September) 
 
TABLE B.1. T-TESTS FOR SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES IN AGE LEFT FULL-TIME EDUCATION FOR COHORTS BORN IN 
1921-41. MALE SAMPLE 
Month of Birth  
(vs all other months) 
t Pr(|T| > |t|) 
January -0.0749 0.9409 
February -1.2105 0.2382 
March -0.8256 0.4172 
April -0.1797 0.8590 
May 0.3722 0.7131 
June 0.4859 0.6315 
July -0.0867 0.9316 
August -0.4755 0.6386 
September 1.5459 0.1346 
October 0.4021 0.6913 
November 0.1951 0.8470 
December 0.0086 0.9932 
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FIGURE B.2. SEASONALITY IN AGE LEFT FULL-TIME EDUCATION FOR COHORTS BORN IN 1941-61. MALE SAMPLE 
(A is April and S is September) 
 
TABLE B.2. T-TESTS FOR SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES IN AGE LEFT FULL-TIME EDUCATION FOR COHORTS BORN IN 
1941-61. MALE SAMPLE 
Month of Birth  
(vs all other months) 
t Pr(|T| > |t|) 
January 0.4499 0.6569 
February 0.1484 0.8832 
March 0.7110 0.4840 
April 0.3068 0.7617 
May 0.1555 0.8777 
June 0.1049 0.9173 
July -2.2182 0.0360** 
August -5.0371 0.0000*** 
September 1.3791 0.1812 
October 1.4906 0.1486 
November 1.2834 0.2111 
December 0.7511 0.4596 
A
A A
A
A
A A A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A A
A
A
S
S
S
S
S S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S S
S
S
1
5.
5
1
6
1
6.
5
A
vg
. A
ge
 L
ef
t F
u
ll-
T
im
e 
E
du
ca
tio
n
1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974
Month Aged 15
Seasonality in Full-time Education - Male 1941-61 Cohorts
41 
 
 
 
FIGURE B.3. SEASONALITY IN EARNINGS FOR COHORTS BORN IN 1921-41. MALE SAMPLE 
(A is April and S is September) 
 
TABLE B.3. T-TESTS FOR SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES IN EARNINGS FOR COHORTS BORN IN 1921-41. MALE SAMPLE 
Month of Birth  
(vs all other months) 
t Pr(|T| > |t|) 
January 0.0645 0.9491 
February -0.1956 0.8465 
March -0.5846 0.5645 
April 1.3882 0.1751 
May -0.4907 0.6284 
June 1.4979 0.1422 
July -0.5500 0.5882 
August 0.4496 0.6567 
September 0.0190 0.9850 
October 1.5436 0.1319 
November -0.0481 0.9620 
December -0.5449 0.5904 
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FIGURE B.4. SEASONALITY IN EARNINGS FOR COHORTS BORN IN 1941-61. MALE SAMPLE 
(A is April and S is September) 
 
TABLE B.4. T-TESTS FOR SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES IN EARNINGS FOR COHORTS BORN IN 1941-61. MALE SAMPLE 
Month of Birth  
(vs all other months) 
t Pr(|T| > |t|) 
January 1.5823 0.1262 
February 2.1104 0.0437** 
March -0.2324 0.8177 
April 0.1572 0.8763 
May 0.1411 0.8888 
June 1.1857 0.2475 
July -0.9570 0.3490 
August -2.6389 0.0143** 
September -0.7718 0.4476 
October 0.3591 0.7229 
November -0.2111 0.8347 
December -0.0117 0.9908 
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Appendix C. Replication Analysis – Additional 2SLS Estimates and AIC 
 
 
 
 
TABLE C.1. 1ST STAGE AND 2SLS EFFECTS OF ROSLA LAWS ON LOG WEEKLY EARNINGS – MALE SAMPLE 
Order YoB GHS 1979-2006 GHS 1979-1986 (H&W) 
Polynomial (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2
S
L
S
 E
st
im
at
es
 
       
One -0.075* -0.057 -0.054 0.032* 0.107*** 0.106*** 
 (0.043) (0.039) (0.039) (0.018) (0.021) (0.026) 
Two 0.029* 0.035** 0.040* 0.002 0.066*** 0.046* 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) 
Three 0.039** 0.040** 0.043* -0.120*** 0.041* 0.007 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.029) 
Four 0.069*** 0.067** 0.072** 0.032 0.065*** 0.040 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.023) (0.022) (0.029) 
Five 0.068** 0.066** 0.072** 0.018 0.042* 0.035 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) 
Six 0.095*** 0.095** 0.104** 0.021 0.010 0.027 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.039) (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) 
       
F
ir
st
-S
ta
g
e 
E
st
im
at
es
 
       
One 0.433*** 0.461*** 0.466*** 0.598*** 0.606*** 0.563*** 
 (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) (0.027) (0.033) (0.038) 
Two 0.535*** 0.553*** 0.563*** 0.607*** 0.617*** 0.576*** 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.047) (0.028) (0.034) (0.039) 
Three 0.584*** 0.597*** 0.601*** 0.550*** 0.601*** 0.552*** 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.046) (0.029) (0.034) (0.040) 
Four 0.490*** 0.482*** 0.477*** 0.620*** 0.626*** 0.580*** 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.036) (0.036) (0.043) 
Five 0.494*** 0.485*** 0.482*** 0.577*** 0.579*** 0.563*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.036) (0.037) (0.043) 
Six 0.454*** 0.444*** 0.451*** 0.562*** 0.556*** 0.550*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.040) (0.040) (0.046) 
       
 Age Controls Quadratic Quartic Dummies Quadratic Quartic Dummies 
NOTE. – H&W is Harmon and Walker (1995). 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE C.2. AIC CALCULATED FOR IV MODELS – MALE SAMPLE 
 Our Own Dataset Harmon and Walker (1995) 
                                                     Order of Polynomial AIC AIC 
1
9
4
7
 R
ef
o
rm
 
       
1 93491 91446 91158 47282 45105 45078 
2 84048 83651 83419 48550 45467 45974 
3 83470 83372 83212 56935 46084 47466 
4 82010 82066 81893 46476 45423 46068 
5 82059 82170 81923 47058 46028 46256 
6 81054 81015 81005 46980 47380 46594 
       
                              Age controls Quadratic Quartic Dummies Quadratic Quartic Dummies 
Notes: Estimates in bold are AIC estimates that apply to those replicated from Devereux and Hart (2010). 
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Appendix D. AIC Values for our New 2SLS Results 
 
TABLE D.1. 2SLS EFFECTS OF ROSLA LAWS ON LOG WEEKLY EARNINGS - MALE SAMPLE, 4TH ORDER YOB/MYOB 
POLYNOMIALS 
Controls 
IV Used 
N Obs 
AIC Values 
Y-o-B polyn., Years of Age 
Old IV 97,478.47 97,576.42 97,557.35 97,524.02 
N=63,746     
New IV 95,125.89 95,010 95,045.78 95,014.58 
N=63,084     
Set of IVs 95,425.22 95,365.39 95,384.26 95,311.52 
N=63,084     
Y-o-B polyn., Years of Age 
Old IV 63,246.28 63,370.55 63,391.39 63,990.74 
N=37,963     
New IV 63,999.03 64,155.46 64,148.94 64,608.14 
N=37,963     
Set of IVs 64,105.66 64,250.68 64,262.73 64,835.88 
N=37,963     
Y-o-B polyn., Years of Age,  
Survey Year FE, Survey Month 
FE, Month of Birth FE 
Old IV 63,110.61 63,256.61 63,300.94 63,801.48 
N=37,963     
New IV 63,476.6 63,652.97 63,631.93 64,030.26 
N=37,963     
Set of IVs 63,520.7 63,671.62 63,697.17 64,188.42 
N=37,963     
M-Y-o-B polyn., Years of Age, 
Survey Year FE, Survey Month 
FE, Month of Birth FE 
Old IV 63,007.45 63,157.48 63,202.82 63,729.19 
N=37,963     
New IV 63,442.39 63,627.35 63,601.18 64,050 
N=37,963     
Set of IVs 63,451.23 63,608.6 63,629.93 64,165.85 
N=37,963     
M-Y-o-B polyn., Months of 
Age, Survey Year FE, Survey 
Month FE, Month of Birth FE 
Old IV 63,002.48 63,172.21 63,217.66  
N=37,963     
New IV 63,446.75 63,658.26 63,626.14  
N=37,963     
Set of IVs 63,447.11 63,622.1 63,647.42  
N=37,963     
 
Age Controls Quadratic Cubic Quartic Dummies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
